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ABSTRACT 
As the Ghanaian economy moved from a regime of command and control to a market 
oriented one, several far- reaching reforms have been implemented to help transform 
the economy and put it on a path leading to the attainment of middle- income status. 
These reforms, in most cases, sought to relax the regulatory environment such that 
regulations serve more as lubricants for fair competition than as barriers in the way of 
development. The telecommunication sector was also blessed with one of these 
reforms. In the wake of the telecom sector reforms the state – owned Post and 
Telecommunication Corporation, the only major player in the telecom sector at the time, 
was split in to two entities namely, Ghana Post and Ghana Telecom. In a bid to liberalise 
the sector, Ghana Telecom was privatised and a second network operator was licensed 
to create duopoly in the telecom sector industry. 
 
Prior to the telecom sector reforms not less than four regulatory bodies were regulating 
the sector but their functions were ceded to the National Communication Authority 
(NCA) as the sole regulator of the sector as the reform gathered momentum .The stage 
was, therefore, thought  to be set for a fair competition among operators. The rate of 
infrastructure development more than doubled and the quality of service improved 
slightly during the post- reform period. However, the two network operators could not 
meet their expansion targets set in their license in terms of fixed line installations. Heavy 
pecuniary penalties were slapped on them. Operators mostly blamed their non- 
performance on the Regulator’s inability to create a level playing field in the sector. 
The key problem of the sector centres on “Access and Interconnection” between 
operators but the Regulator has not been adequately and firmly positioned to deal with 
this problem. 
For the Regulator to make an impact it is suggested that the NCA Board be properly 
constituted just like (OFCOM in the UK) while efforts are made to appoint its substantive 
head, develop its regulatory guidelines, and make it completely independent of 
government control and above all, incorporate some of the Directives as contained in EU 
legal regulatory framework (as adopted in the UK) which are appropriate, in the NCA 
ACT of Ghana.         
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0   Introduction 
In the past decades telecommunication  organizations  in  most countries   were state – 
owned  and  most  governments  were  reluctant  to  allow  for  private  participation . 
 
The experience in Latin America confirms that privatizing the telecommunication  industry  
does  not  always  translate  to  increased  access( Winseck , 2002)
1
   
It  is   also  the  case  that  for  the  reasons   of  national  sovereignty  many  African  and  
Arab  countries    are  reluctant  to  privatize  totally . National  telecom  networks  in  
developing  countries   are  generally  seen  as  symbols  of  national  pride .These   
observations  hold  true  for  Ghana    both  in  the  parliamentary  debates  about  the  law  
that  deregulated   telecom  and  the  government „s  timid  effort  to  implement  it .The  
fear  of  alienating  the people  and  making  them  feel  a  sense  of  national  loss  may  
have  accounted  for   why  Ghana  did  not  totally  privatize , but  rather  opted  for  a  
regulated   sector  with   controlled  private  sector   participation .  
 
 During  the  debates  in  1994,  a  member  of  the  Ghanaian  Parliament  posed  a  caution  
to  the   House  that  Ghana  Telecom (GT) “  is  a  symbol  of  national  sovereignty   and  
that  any  communication   policy  should  aim  at  protecting  it .” 
According  to  Winsock    the  general  unwillingness  to  privatize completely  suggests  
that  the  global  dogma  of  deregulation   in  the  1980‟s  and  the  1990‟s   is  being  
everywhere.   
 
The telecommunications   industry  has been  undergoing a   fundamental   change  in  
structure  ,  from  that  of  monopoly    to  one  of  competition  (Walden & Angel,2005 )
2
 
                                                 
1“ Winseck  Dwayne  ( 2002) The  WTO , Emerging Policy Regimes And  The Political  Economy of  
Transnational Communications”  in Marc  Raboy (ed) Global Media Policy  In The New Millennium .Luton 
University of Luton Press 
2
 Ian Walden & John  Angel (2005),  Telecommunications  Law  And  Regulation 
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This  phenomenon has  become  possible  in  this  contemporary  times  because  of  the  
policy  of  liberalization  and  privatization   adopted   by  governments  in  most  countries    
with  the  aim of creating  competition  and  injecting  efficiency  in  the  
telecommunication  industry. 
As   a   result  of   this,  there  has  been  a  lot  of  private   telecommunication  companies  
in  the  Ghanaian  telecom  industry   for  the   past  few  years .  
 
However, an  independent  regulator   known  as  the  National  Communication   Authority   
has  been  set  by  an  Act  of  parliament  to  regulate  the  operations  of  these  various  
companies  that  has sprang  up   in  the  industry  and  for   the  new    ones  that  are  yet   
to  enter  the  industry  in  order  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  and  effective  
competition  in  the  industry. 
 
The  emerging  consensus  is  that  “ strong   governance    regimes  are  vital   pillars  of  
telecommunications  policy  reforms
3
  .”But  is  the  post colonial  state  capable   of  
setting  up  an  effective    regulatory  mechanism? This   thesis  tends  to  examine  in  
detail  the   role  of  the  Ghana   National  Communication   Authority  in  the   wake of  
the   privatization  of  the  telecom  sector   in  the   light   of  the  experience  of   the   UK.  
National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (i.e. OFCOM) as the national regulator 
to oversee duopolistic telecom sector. What  does  it  mean  for  a  downsized   state  and  
its  institutions   such  as  the  National  Communication  Authority  (NCA)    to  regulate  
big  business   in  an  emerging  telecom  sector ?Is  the  postcolonial  state  up  to the  task  
of   instituting    a  strong  governance  regime   over  the   steamy  juicy   sector  of  
telecommunications  in    a   flourishing   era  of  digital   capitalism . 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Amin Alhassan, (2003) Telecom Regulation, the Post Colonial State and the Big Business. The Ghanaian 
Experience 
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
This work sought to interrogate the contemporary communication policy practices of the 
Ghanaian State. The rise of the global digital economy has transformed the hitherto bland 
telecommunication sector in developing countries, particularly Ghana, ( with the heavy 
influx of foreign telecommunication companies in the sector) into a steamy and juicy pie 
that attracts the attention of big business, the expertise and finance of international capital, 
as well as local businesses. In its bid to increase phone access, the post colonial state in 
Ghana, under the tutelage of organizations such as the World Bank has embarked on 
setting in place a new regime of liberalized and privatized telecom industry. 
 
A new regulatory agency, National Communication Authority (NCA) has been set up to 
independently oversee the sector. But the questions to ask is whether, the purportedly 
independent NCA can face the challenges and temptations of the new digital economy? 
And whether the NCA is up to the task of regulating the telecom sector in Ghana 
particularly through the law on Access and interconnection between operators in the 
industry to ensure fair and effective competition taking into consideration the role of „Big‟ 
National Telecom Regulators such as OFCOM in the UK. Also if there are gaps between 
the two regulators how do we bridge this gap? More specifically, what need to be taken to 
amend the existing legal regulatory framework? (Implicit: does the “Ofcom model” 
provide an appropriate legal regulatory framework for Ghana to follow?)  
 
   
    
1.2 Justification of the Study 
 Since  the  telecom  sector  ( world- wide)   in  the  past  was  state  - owned  of  which  
Ghana  is  not  an  exception , there  was  no  need  for  an  independent  or  a  separate  
regulator  to   regulate  the  sector.  However, the  policy  of  liberalization  and  
privatization   and  the  fact  that  there  is  political  stability  in  the  country   there  has  
 4 
been  a  lot  of  private   and  foreign  investors  in  the  telecom  sector  and  therefore  we  
have  currently  a  lot  of  telecommunication  companies  in  the  industry.  As  a  result  a  
regulatory  body  known  as  the  National  Communication  Authority  ( NCA)  has  been  
set  up  by  an  Act  of  Parliament  to  regulate  and  control  the  operations  and  activities  
in  the  industry  to  ensure fair and effective  competition  and  ensure  the  growth  of  the  
sector. 
 
Conversely, the study focused on how the NCA regulates the telecom industry through the 
grant of license for telecom service providers to operate in the industry and more 
particularly how it is able to regulate the industry by ensuring that Access is granted by 
“big” operators of their heavy physical equipment to the new entrants and also 
interconnection is made possible between operators to ensure fair and effective competition 
in the industry. For instance, for the past few months, telecom giants like Vodafone, Zain 
telecom ( a Kuwaiti telecom company ), Glow etc have all joined the Ghanaian telecom 
industry hence the need to re- look at the NCA role of granting operational license and also 
on the law on Access and interconnection. 
 
The thesis is intended to examine the role of NCA and the adequacy of the law on Access 
and interconnection and juxtapose or compare it to that of OFCOM and the E-U legal 
regulatory framework. Besides the fact OFCOM is an established regulatory body in the 
UK telecom industry OFCOM, is used as a comparative base or standard for comparison 
due to the fact that, the UK being the former colonial masters of Ghana and the fact that the 
two countries operate similar systems I thought that there are a lot to learn from their 
regulatory body in the telecom industry which is more vibrant as compared to that of 
Ghana which happens to be a new institution. Comparison will also be made with the E-U 
regulatory model on Access and interconnection.  
 
This study aims at making a contribution to the general hypothesis that the development of 
an adequate legal regime for ICT‟s generally will enhance their ability to positively affect 
 5 
the governance process
4
 . By making Access and interconnection possible, it is presumed 
that access to telecommunication service will improve and with the proper regulatory 
framework in place, programmes such as e- commerce, E- democracy/ governance and e- 
learning and their consequential benefits can be made publicly available. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The lack of adequate and tighter laws on Access and interconnection will drive infant 
operators out of operation and consequently kill competition completely and this means 
that there will be high tariffs low quality of service and others.  
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The overall objective is to examine the role of the National Communication Authority in 
Ghana in regulating the telecommunication industry particularly through the legislation on 
Access and Interconnection using OFCOM in UK and also the E-U legal regulatory 
framework as the comparative basis for the assessment.  
 
The specific objectives of the study are -: 
 
1. To examine the role of NCA and the current legal regulatory framework on Access 
and Interconnection in the Ghanaian telecom industry. 
 
    2.  To examine how OFCOM regulates the UK telecom industry through the legislation 
on Access and Interconnection.                                                                       
          
   3.To propose the way forward or advance measures that need to be taken to amend the 
existing legal regulatory framework if there is a gap between the Ghanaian telecom Act (or 
deficiencies in the NCA role) and that of UK and the E-U as a whole 
 
 
                                                 
4
 E.M Bakibinga, (2004), Regulating market entry in the telecommunications sector in an integrated East 
Africa: Towards a common Licensing framework.   
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 1.5 Scope of the Study 
The geographical scope of the study was mainly limited to Ghana. The role of OFCOM 
was also discussed to the extent that it was relevant to the study. The E-U legal regulatory 
frame work (i.e. The Access Directive 2002/19/EC) was also made reference to. 
    
 
1.6 Research Methodology       
The  researcher  actually  applied  the  problem  solving  methodology  and  this  was  
restricted  to  describing  the  difficulty  addressed,  defining  whose  and  what  behaviors    
constitute  the  difficulty , specifying  the  causes  of  the  problematic  behaviors  before  
proposing  solutions  to  the  identified  problems .
5
  The  qualitative  research  
methodology  was  also  applied  by  the  researcher . There  was  also  a  historical  
analysis  of  the  development  of   telecommunication  in  Ghana  and  the  genesis  of  the  
NCA. It  is  therefore,  imperative  to  state that   much  emphasis  was  placed  on  
secondary  resources. However, the research involved the following: 
 
1.An  extensive  and  a  comprehensive  review  of  relevant  literature  from  distinguished  
centres  such  as  the  Norwegian  Research  Centre  for  Computers  and  Laws (NRCCL) , 
the  faculty  of  law  library  of  the  University  of  Oslo, parliamentary  debates  of  the  
Ghanaian  parliament , a  variety  of  communications  law  centers  and  universities  and  
also  more  importantly  internet  resources. This  literature  included  legislative  policy  
documents  and  analyses  by  various  academic  scholars  from  Africa , Europe  and  the  
United  States. 
 
2. Qualitative  interviews  with   some  officials  in  NCA  and  other  professionals  and  
private  sector  practitioners  involved  in  the  telecommunication  sectors   in  Ghana  and  
other  parts  of  the  world (including  the  UK)    
 
 
                                                 
5
 A. Seidman R. Seidman and N. Abeysekere , legislative  drafting  for  democratic  social  change  - A 
manual  for  drafters , Kluwer  Law  International , Boston ,  2001  p.176. 
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1.7 Synopsis 
Chapter  one  basically  encompasses  a  brief  introduction  to  the  study , the  objectives  
that  the  study  was  intended  to  achieve, the  statement of  the  problem , the  scope  or  
the  frame work  of  the  study, reasons  justifying  the  conduct  of  the  study and  the  
research  methodology  that  was  used  in  conducting  the  research. 
 
Chapter  two  covers  a  historical  analysis  of  the  development  of  telecommunication  in  
Ghana , the genesis of NCA, the  basic  principles, objectives  and  the procedures  
involved  in  licensing  and more importantly   the  role  of NCA in  regulating Ghanaian  
the  telecom  industry, through the existing legal framework on Access and interconnection 
to ensure fair and effective competition.  
 
Chapter three deals with an overview of OFCOM as the regulator of the UK telecom 
industry and a brief examination of the appropriate legal regulatory framework of the E-U 
on Access and interconnection  
 
Chapter four concentrates on the findings, a summary of recommendations and conclusion  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN GHANA 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
The  Republic  of Ghana  is  a West  African  nation on  the  Gulf  of  Guinea  with  an  
area  of about  92,000  square  miles  and  a  population  of  about  20  million. Its  
topography  consist  of  forest  and  savannah,  and  the  country  is  divided  into  ten  
regions,  with  the  national  capital  located  at  Accra. Ghana  has  a  lot  of  ethnic  groups  
with  the  six  largest  ones  as  the  Akans  ( 44% of  the  population),  Ewe (13% ),  Gad – 
Adangbe ( 8%),  Mole – Dagbane (16%)  Guans (4%), and Grume (3%), and the official 
language is English. The Volta is  Ghana‟s largest  river  and  the  location of the Volta 
lake  on  which  are  built  two  hydro  dams, Akosombo and  Kpong ,  with  a  total  
capacity  of  about  1.12  gigawatts 
 
Ghana‟s  main  export  products  are  cocoa, gold and  timber  other  exports  include  
diamond,  bauxite  and  manganese.  The  fluctuation  of  world  market  prices  and  the  
absence  of  processing  industries  for  these  products  have  historically  affected  
Ghana‟s  revenues.  Ghana  imports  oil  for  energy  consumption,  exports  hydro  
electricity to  Togo, Benin  and  Burkina  Faso. 
 
The  world  bank‟s  estimate  of  Ghana‟s  GNP  in  1991  was  about  440  per  capita.  
Since  1984  Ghana  has  been  implementing  an  Economic  Recovery  Programme,  
which  gives  the  country  easier  access  to  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  
Word  Bank  loans.   
 
Since  1981,  Ghana  has  been  a  unitary  Republic  ruled  by  decree. In  November  1992,  
however,  an  election  was  held  to  elect  a  president  for  the  next  democratically  
 9 
elected  parliamentary  government. In  January  1993,  following  parliamentary  elections,  
Ghana  returned  to  a  parliamentary  form  of  government.
6
 
 
 
2.1.1 The Situation of Telecom in the Pre-colonial Era 
The  first  telegraph  line  in  Ghana ( then  known  as  the  Gold  Coast)  was  a  ten  mile  
link  installed  in  1881  between  the  castle  of  the  colony‟s  then  governor  in  Cape 
Coast  and  Elmina. The line was extended to Christian Borg Castle near Accra. which  
became  the  seat  of  government,  and  later  extended  still  further  to  Aburi,  about  26  
miles  outside    Accra.
7
  
 
In  1982,  the  first  public  telegraph  line,  stretching  over  a  distance  of  2.5  miles  was  
erected  between  Christian Borg  and  Accra. Between  1887  and  1889,  these  telegraph  
lines  were  extended  to  cover  Accra,  Pram,  Winnebago, Saltpond, Sekondi, Ankobra, 
Dixc  ove , and  Shama  all  colonial   castles  or  fort  towns  as  well  as  commercial  ports  
and  fishing  centres
8
.  In  1886,  telegraph  lines  were  extended  to  the  middle  and  
northern  parts  of  Ghana  into  the  territory  of  the  Ashanti's. Between 1900 and 1901, 
this new communications technology was used  to  subdue the Ashanti‟s in the Yaw 
Asantewaa  war.
9
 
 
Because  Ghana  telegraph  line  were  often  cut  down  by  superstitious  locals were 
convinced  that  the  cables  were  “magic”  lines  being  used  by  the  Europeans  to  win  
wars. Ghana‟s colonial  governor   entrusted  the  safety  and  security  of  the  lines  to  the  
tribal  chiefs  in  1886. The  colonial  governors  offered  chiefs  handsome  rewards  for  
reporting  any  damage  done  to  the  lines. 
 
                                                 
6
 Francis K.A Allotey & Felix  K. Akorli,  www.vii.org/papers/ghana 
7
 Ibid 
8
 Ibid 
9
 Ibid 
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However,  in  order  to  improve  communications  in  the  southern  part  of  the  country,  
the  first  manual  telephone  exchange  (70  lines )  was  installed  in  Accra  in  1892.  
Twelve  years  later,  in  1904,  a  second  manual  exchange  consisting  of  13  lines  was  
installed  in  Cape Coast
10
. 
 
2.1.2 Situation  O f  Telecom Under The English Colonial  Rule 
Having  looked  at  how  Ghana‟s  telecom  was  during   the  pre-colonial  era it    is  
therefore  pertinent  to  also  describe briefly how  the  situation  was  during  the  British  
imperialism . 
 
Ghana‟s  telecommunications  infrastructure  was  laid  down  and  expanded  by  the    
colonial  administration  mainly  to  facilitate  the  economic, social,  and  political  
administration  of  the  colony. In  1901, for example,  the Ashantis  were  brought  under  
British  colonial rule,  and  telegraph  lines  were  accordingly  extended  from  Accra  to  
the  capital  of  the  Ashanti's  Kingdom  and  beyond. By  the  end  of  1912,  1,492  miles  
of  telegraph  lines  had  been  constructed  to  meet  to  link  forty – eight  telegraph  
offices  spread  throughout  the  country
11
. 
 
Before  the  beginning  of  world  war  one  in  1914,  170  telephone  subscribers  had  
been  served  in  Ghana,  but  it  was  between  world  war  one  and  1920  that  the  
backbone  of  the  main  trunk  telephone  routes  Accra – Takoradi , Accra – Kumasi, 
Kumasi – Takoradi, and  Kumasi – Tamale  was  built  using  unshielded  copper  wires12. 
By  1930,  the  number  of  telephone  exchange  lines  in  Ghana  had grown  to  1,560,  
linking  the  coastal  region  with  the  central  and  northern  parts  of  the  country
13
. 
 
Due  to  the  depressed  of  the  global  economy  in  the  1940s  there  was  little  or  no  
growth  in  telecommunications  in  Ghana  during  and  immediately  after  the  second   
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world  war. Nevertheless,  during  that  period  carrier  equipment  was  installed  on  the  
Accra – Takoradi, Accra – Kumasi, Kumasi – Takoradi , Kumasi – Tamale physical trunks. 
These  were  later  augmented  by 1 + 3 carrier  equipment, thus  increasing  the  trunks  
connecting  these  towns  threefold. 
 
In  1953, the  first  automatic  telephone  exchange  with  200  lines was  installed  in  
Accra  to  replace the manual one erected  63  years  later. Three  years  later in  1956,  the  
trunk lines  connecting  Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, and  Tamale  were  upgraded  through  
the  installation  of a 48- and 12- channel  VHF  network
14
. 
 
2.1.3 The Post Colonial Period      
  The  attainment  of  independence  by  Ghana  in  1957  brought  new  dynamism  to  the  
country‟s  telecommunications  development. A seven  year development  plan launched  
just  after  independence  hastened the  completion  of  a  second  new  automatic  exchange 
in  Accra  in  1957. By  the  end  of  1963 , over 16000  telephone  subscribers  and  32000 
rotary  type  telephones  were  in  use  in  Ghana
15
. 
 
Due  to  the  rapid  growth  in  commercial  activities  in  mining, timber , 
 Cocoa, shear  butter and  the  like  in  outlying  parts  of  the  country, new  manual  
exchanges  were  installed  in  Cantoments, Accra, Swedru, 
16
Koforidua, Ho, Tamale, 
Sunyani, and  Kumasi  during  the  post  independence  years. The installed exchanges 
were stronger (step- by – step) and Philip UR 49 switch exchanges. 
 
The  management  of  Ghana  telecommunication  institutions  was  initially  assigned  to 
the   Public  Works  Department  but  was  transferred  to  the  post  office  following  the  
enactment  of  the  Post  Office  Ordinance  in  1886
17
. Telecommunications  was  later  
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administered  by  the  government „s Post  And  telecommunication  Department  until  the  
early  1970‟s . 
 
 
2.1.4 The  Present Era  
A  new  chapter  in  the  development  of  Ghana‟s  telecommunications  began  in  
November  1974,  when  the  Post  And  telecommunication  Department  was  a  declared  
a  Public  corporation  by  the  National  Redemption  Council  Decree  No.  311.  The  
department  was  placed  under  the  authority  of  the  ministry  of  transport  and  
communication,  which  currently  has  been  segregated  and  therefore,  there  is  a  
separate/whole ministry  of  communication     today,     responsible    for  the  formulation  
of  policy  and  the  control  of  Ghana‟s  telecommunication  sector. 
 
Under the instrument of  incorporation,  the  Post  And  Telecommunication  corporation  
was  to be  administered  by  a  board  of  directors  who  function  as  the  corporation‟s  
governing  body. There is a director  general,  who  is  the  chief executive accountable to 
the board of  directors and responsible for the organization, maintenance, and  development  
of  all  the  corporation‟  services ( domestic  and   international)  as  well  as  the  
determination  of  financial  policies. The  director  general  also  ensures  that  government  
policies  on  telecommunication  are  implemented  and  that  rules  and  regulations  
governing the various services  as  well as international conventions are correctly  
interpreted and acted upon. 
 
2.2 Deregulation  Of  Telecommunications  In  Ghana  
Prior  to  1980,  the  Post And  telecommunications  was  the  sole  supplier  and  distributor  
of  all  telecommunications  terminal  equipment  to  the  public
18
. It  was  also  the  only  
institution  that  could  install  and  maintain  telecommunications  equipment  and  run  
telephone  services  to  the  public.( with  the  exception  of  two -  way  radio  
telecommunications  equipment,  which  was  also  being supplied  and  installed  by  a  
few  private  foreign  companies ) . In  1987, however , the  government  of  Ghana  relaxed  
                                                 
18
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the  regulations, and  private  companies  began  to  be  issued  licenses  and  allocated  
frequencies  enabling  them  to  produce,  install  and  maintain  any  compatible  
telecommunications  equipment
19
. By  1992, about  forty  telephone  companies  were  in  
operation,  including  a  local  cellular  company  and  a  paging  company
20
.  Other  
companies  supply,  install  and  maintain  terminal  equipment  such  as  facsimiles , 
telephones,  PBX  and  PABX  (  with  capacities  ranging  from  4  to  4,300  extensions  
and  manufactured  by  such  companies  as  Panasonic, Toshiba, AT & T. Alcatel,  Philips  
and  British  Telecom ). Most  of  the  companies now  allowed  to  operate  in  Ghana  are  
subsidiaries of  companies  in  Europe  and  the  United States
21
.                        
 
As  a  result  of  deregulating  the  telecom  industry  in  Ghana a  lot  of  foreign  
companies  have  joined  the  industry,  and  therefore  making  the  industry  very  
competitive. This  phenomenon  has  also  forced  a  lot  of  local  telecom  companies  to  
run  out  of  business .However,  in  the  subsequent  pages  the  study  will  focus  on  how  
the  NCA  can  regulate  the  sector  effectively  through  its  licensing  role  in  order  to  
ensure  fairness  and  stability  in  the  market  in  order  to  encourage  local  investors  into  
the  industry  to  compete  equally  with  the  foreign  companies. 
 
2.3 Telecommunications  Policy  In  Ghana  
Before  I  delve  deep  into  the  role  ( with  specific  emphasis  on  the  licensing  role  of  
NCA)  Of  NCA   in  regulating  the  telecom  sector,  it  is  therefore , imperative  to  
discuss  the  national  policy  relating  the  telecom  sector. Hence  this  section  actually  
focuses  on  the  nature  of  the  country‟s   telecom  policy which was documented in 
Ghana. 
 
The  evolution  of  the  telecommunications  industry  over  the  past  several   years  has  
yielded  a  wide  array  of  dramatic  changes  in  the  technology  of  human  
communication,  and  the  role  that  advanced  electronic  communications  play  in  all 
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aspects  of  society  and  the  economy.  Among  the  most  important  developments  aside 
from  technological  innovation  and  newness,  has  been  the  transformation  of  the  
global  and  domestic  telecommunications  industry  from  a  largely  monopolized,  state – 
owned  model  to  a  broadly  competitive,  private,  and  open 
22
 market  model.  Ghana  
has  been  among  the  leading  countries  in  Africa  in  promoting  these  developments  ; 
Ghana  first  opened  its  basic  telecommunications  industry  to  private  competition  a  
decade  ago,  Ghana  continues  to  be  a  leader  among  African  nations  in  the  
expansion  of  market  entry ,  the  development  of  new  services  and  business  
arrangements  and  the  growth  of  the  telecommunications  sector  generally. 
 
This  policy  intends  to move  Ghana yet  further  forward, by  promoting  still  broader  
opening  of  all  telecommunications  market  segments  to  private,  competitive  market  
forces. The  government  is  convinced  that  the  interest  of  consumers  and  businesses  
in  Ghana  to  achieve  optimum  access  to  the  best  quality  and  most  cost – effective  
telecommunications  service  will  be  accomplished  through  the  wisdom  and  incentives  
of  the  competitive  market.. To  this  end, this  policy  seeks  to  establish  conditions  that  
will  be  most  favorable  to  encouraging  further  sector  growth,  and  the  reorientation   
of  the  overall  market  structure,  through  affirmative  liberalization  and  competition   
policies.  The  provisions  of  this  section  set  forth  the  terms  under  which  the  
continued  leadership  of  Ghana  in  these  areas  will  be  fulfilled. 
 
2.3.1 Principles  Of  Competitive  Market  Development 
The  development  of  telecommunications  in  the  Republic  of  Ghana  shall  be  based  
upon  principles  of  open  markets   and  fair  competition. To  the  greatest  extent  
possible,  the  government  shall  encourage  telecommunication  growth  through  the  
initiative  and  innovation  of  the  private,  competitive market  place  at  all  levels,  with   
particular  emphasis  on  promoting  local  entrepreneurship
23
. 
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Regulation  of  entry  and  operation  in  the  Ghana  Telecommunications  market  shall  be  
governed  by  principles  of  fair  competition,  equitable  treatment  of  all  players,  and  
practical  oversight  of  operators  with  significant  market  power. Licensing  and  
regulation  shall  be  technologically  neutral ,  to  encourage  economically  efficient  and  
innovative  market  development
24
 .  Ultimately, the  interests  of  consumers  in  obtaining  
high  quality,  accessible,  and  affordable  telecommunication  services  shall  be  the  
primary  objective  of  all  policy  and  regulatory  decisions.   
 
2.3.2 Telecommunications  Market  Structure  
The  government  recognizes  that  the  technology  and  markets  of  telecommunications  
have  been  changing  rapidly,  and  will  continue  to  evolve  in  unpredictable  directions  
in  the  future. The  traditional  market  for  telecommunications  in  Ghana  must  evolve  
with  these  changes,  to  allow  for  robust  and  flexible  developments of new services,  
marketing options and customer choices
25
. At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  practical  to  
overhaul  the  entire  present  structure  of  the  telecommunications  market  immediately.  
The  goal  of  this  policy  is  to  establish  a  fundamental  vision   for  the  eventual  market  
structure  that  will  be  most  beneficial  to  Ghana‟s  citizens  and  businesses,  and  to  set   
in  motion  the  procedures  and  incentives  that  will  encourage  the  market  to  evolve  
toward  that  vision. This  section  of  the  policy  identifies  the  main  elements  of  the  
current  and  emerging  market  structure  for  telecommunications  service  in  Ghana. 
 
2.3.3 International telecommunications Segment           
 The  international  market   segment  consists  of  telecommunications  facilities  and  
services  which  carry  communication  signals  across  Ghana‟s  international  borders. 
These  however,  include  the  following  elements: 
 
a. Licensed  gateway  operators 
- Operators  with  official  authorization  to  maintain  physical  
gateway  connections  to  international  destination. 
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- As  of  June  2004, there  were  two  such  licensed  gateway  
operators  in  Ghana.
26
 
 
 
SAT – 3 acess 
- Ghana  telecom‟s  consortium  relationship  with  the  SAT – 3  
cable  ownership,  and  the  international transit  capacity  this  
provides. 
 
Private Licensed VSAT Systems  
-  Licensed  for  private  user  access   to  international  data  networks  
via  VSAT  technology. 
Unlicensed international bypass services
27
 
- Unauthorized  service providers  utilizing  new  technologies  to  
connect   international  voice  calls  to  the  local   public  network,  
bypassing  the  gateway  facilities  and  charges  of  the  licensed  
international operators. 
 
2.3.4 Domestic Public Telephone Services 
The  market  segment  for  domestic  public  telephone  services  includes  all  facilities  
and  services  that  connect  telephone  calls  between  users  within Ghana.  This segment, 
however consist of the following components: 
 
a. Fixed Wire line Networks 
  - Traditional,  wire line telephone  networks ,  connecting  fixed  locations  via  permanent  
terrestrial  links. 
 
  - Two  major  such  networks  are     licensed ( as  of  June,  2004 )  to  offer  basic  
telephone  services  throughout  Ghana. 
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b. Wireless Mobile Networks 
 - Telephone  networks  which  connect  calls  via  wireless  radio  technologies , 
traditionally  utilizing  cellular  mobile  technology  and  frequencies  as  defined  by ( ITU)  
standards. 
 
 - Operation  of  these  networks  requires  both  formal  authorization  to  utilize  a  
designated  frequency  band , as  well  as  a license  to  provide  public ( mobile ) telephone  
service . 
 
 - As  of  February,  2009  there  are  currently  five  licensed  wireless  mobile  network  
operators  in  Ghana   and  all  five  are  actively  providing
28
  mobile  telephone  services. 
Another  mobile  network  operator is  on  the  verge  of  being  licensed  to  also  operate  
by  April, 2009. 
 
c. Public Telephones and Telecenters    
   - These  services  consist  of  public  access  locations  that  allow  consumers  to  place   
telephone  calls  for  a  one - time  charge.  
 
   -  Traditionally public  pay  telephones  have  been  owned  and  operated  by  licensed  
telephone  network  operators,  but  informal  and  unofficial  arrangements  exist  whereby  
private  businesses  operate  telecasters  which  resell  telephone  calls  to  the  public. 
 
2.4 Liberalization and Licensing Regime     
      Under  this policy, further  expansion of  the  telecommunications  market  will  be  
encouraged  through  a  process  of  active,  phased  liberalization  of  market  segments,  
and  a  licensing  regime  that  facilitates  widespread  entry  into  the  market  place
29
. This  
section  identifies  the  target  objectives  for  liberalization  and  licensing  options  within  
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each  market  segment. Responsibilities  for  further  elaborating  and  implementing  the  
licensing  processes  are  defined  in  section  3 of  the  policy. 
 
    2.4.1 International Telecommunications 
        There  shall  be  a  phased  process  of  allowing  additional  international  gateway  
licenses  to  be  made  available  initially  to  all  existing  licensed  telecommunications  
operators  in Ghana
30
; 
 
      The  NCA,  in  consultation  with  the  ministry, shall  establish  the  specific   
qualifying  criteria  that  operators  must  meet  to  be  awarded  an  international gateway  
license;  such  criteria  shall  be  transparent  and  competitively  neutral , and  such  
licenses  shall  carry  similar  obligations  for  all  licensees
31
; 
 
       The  eventual,  long  term  objective  of   this  policy  shall  be  to  remove  any  
limitations  on  the  number  and  type  of  international  gateway  licenses, upon  
determination  by  the  ministry  and  the  NCA  that  the  market  is  sufficiently  
competitive  and  developed  to  function  adequately  without  license  restrictions; 
 
        The  NCA,  in  consultation  with  the  Ministry,  shall  also  establish  standards  and  
procedures  for  issuing  class  authorizations  to  non- facilities-  based  international  ( 
bypass )  telephone  service  providers. Such  authorizations  will  permit  the  service  
provider  to  utilize  any  technology  to  receive  or  transmit  international  
communications  over  facility – based  networks,  subject  to  cost – based  and  
economically  compensatory  interconnection  charges,  and  such  other  reasonable   fees  
and  charges  as  the  NCA  shall  determine. Operators  which  seek  to  offer  such  
services  without  proper  authorization  shall  be  deemed  illegal,  and  subject  to  
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appropriate  termination  of  access, fines  and  other  remedies  to  be  determined  by  the  
NCA
32
; 
 
  Private  users  may  continue  to  obtain   and  operate  access   facilities  to  serve  their  
internal  international  telecommunications  requirements  without  limitation,  subject  only  
to  obtaining  authorization  from  NCA. NCA  shall  not  place  unreasonable   obligations,  
restrictions , or  fees  upon  such  private  international  access  facilities. 
 
2.4.2 Domestic Public Telephone Services            
     The  NCA , in  consultation  with  the  ministry,  shall  expedite  the  full  opening  of  
the  market  for  construction  and  operation  of  domestic  telephone  networks  and  
services. The  NCA  shall  establish  a  licensing  process  for  such  domestic  networks  
that  imposes  minimal  restrictions  on  entry,  and  reasonable  levels  of  common  
obligations  and  fees  for  new  licensees. 
 
    In  issuing  licenses  for  domestic  telephone  services , NCA  shall  apply  technology – 
neutral  standards,  allowing  licensed  operators  to  deploy  any  combination  of  
technologies  that  they  choose  to  serve  their  customers , subject  only  to  requirements  
for  frequency  authorization,  and  appropriate  network  inter- operability  and  quality  of  
service  standards. 
 
 New  and  existing domestic  telephone  operators  shall  be  permitted  to  introduce  
services  anywhere  within  Ghana,  subject  only   to  broad  class  licenses  governing   
standard  requirements  and  obligations  for  interconnection,  basic service  tariffs,  
universal  service  contributions  and  other  common  license  provisions  to  be  
determined  by  NCA.  Such requirements must be competitively neutral.
33
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     NCA  may  also  establish  special  rules  and  incentives  to  encourage  operators  to  
construct  and  operate  telephone  facilities  in  rural  and  other  underserved  areas. 
2.4.3 Frequency Authorizations 
   Any   domestic  telephone  operator  that  seeks  to  provide  service  partially  or  entirely  
via  wireless  radio  transmission  must  obtain  a  formal  authorizations  for  use  of  a  
designated  band  of    the  frequency  spectrum. Once  such  a  frequency  assignment has  
been  granted,  the  operator  shall  have  unrestricted  rights  to  utilize  the  spectrum  for  
any  form  of  public  telephone  service, consistent  with  the  terms  of  its  license. 
 
 In  particular,  there  shall  be  no  arbitrary  restrictions  on  the  use  of  authorized  radio  
transmission  frequencies  to  provide  any  combination  of  mobile  and  fixed  telephone  
services  that  an  operator  and  its  customers  may  choose.  Authorized  “mobile”  
operators  may  also  install  and  operate  “fixed”  telephone  services,  utilizing  their  
assigned  radio  frequencies  and / or  wire line  connections, without  undue  limitations,  
subject  only  to  competitively  neutral  license  obligations. 
 
The  NCA  may  assign  frequency  bands  on  a  national  or a  regional  geographic  basis,  
to  ensure  the  most  efficient  utilization  of  the  spectrum  and  development  of  services.  
Geographically  narrow  assignments  of  unused  frequency  bands  may  be  made  
available  to  smaller, local  operators  in  remote  areas  to  promote  cost  effective  
development  of  local  networks  and  services  .  Such  assignments  must  not  interfere  
with  nationwide  or  regional  authorizations  for  mobile  or  other  wireless  
telecommunications  applications.  
       
2.4.4 Dedicated Transmission Networks 
There  shall  be  no  undue  restrictions  on  construction  and  operation  of  dedicated  
networks  for  wholesale,  private  line, and / or  public  distribution  purposes.
10
 
 
Such  networks  shall  be  subject  to  class  license  authorizations,  which  may  include  
related  obligations  such  as Gifted contributions . facility  sharing  , competitive  
 21 
neutrality,  and  transparent  terms  and  conditions  for  access  to  and  use  of  network  
capacity. 
 
Where  construction  of  such  dedicated  networks  depend  upon  access  to  public  rights  
of  way, any  operator  obtaining  such  rights  of  way  must  share  access  with  any  
additional  network   providers,  under  competitively  neutral  and  economically  
compensatory  terms  and  conditions ,  to be  negotiated  between  the  operators  under  
NCA  guidance. 
 
Where  dedicated  transmission  networks  are   intended  to  provide  for  public  
distribution  services  such  as  cable  TV ,  the  NCA  may  establish  additional  
responsibilities  and  criteria  for  the  operation  of  such  services ,  including  pricing  and  
content  regulations  as  appropriate .      
 
2.4.5 Internet Services 
 There  shall  be  no  limitations  on  entry  and  operation  in  the  market  to  provide  
internet  services. 
 
 ISPs  shall  require  authorization  via  class  licenses  only,  subject  to  minimal  
obligation  and  regulatory  oversight,  obligation  may  include  contributions  to  Giftel  
contribution  and / or other  universal  access  responsibilities,  quality  of  service  
standards,  customer  service  guarantees;  there  shall  be  no  regulation  of  ISP  pricing. 
 
 ISPs  integrated  with  dominant  licensed  telephone  and  backbone  network  operators  
must  be  established  as  separate  subsidiaries  or  affiliates,  may  not  be  cross – 
subsidized  directly  or  indirectly  by  dominant  telephone  service  revenues,  and  must   
conform  to  all  competitive  safeguards  that  NCA  shall  establish.  
34
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2.5 THE ROLE OF NCA IN REGULATING THE GHANAIAN TELECOM 
INDUSTRY. 
Having  highlighted  in  the  previous  pages  of  the  Ghanaian  telecommunication  policy,  
it  is  therefore  imperative  to  look  at  the  role  of  the  NCA  in  regulating  the  telecom 
industry.  Hence,  this  section  actually  focuses extensively on  the  role  of  NCA,  taking  
into  consideration  the  Ghanaian  Telecom  policy ( ie  whether  NCA  complies  with  the  
Telecom  Policy  in  regulating  the  industry ). 
 
2.5.1 Introduction  
The  NCA  was  established  by  an  Act  of  Parliament,  the  NCA  Act  524, 1996  as  part  
of  Ghana‟s  telecom  sector  reform  policy implemented  in  1996  to  introduce  
privatization,  liberalization,  and  controlled  competition  into  the  telecommunications  
industry
35
.  This  efforts  corresponds  to  a  global  push  for  separate  national  regulatory  
bodies  different  from  the  regular  ministries  or  departments  of  state.  In  1990,  there  
were  only  12  0f  such  bodies  in  the  world, and  by  1996  NCA  became  one  of  53  in  
the  world
36
.  The figure rose to 101 by 2000(ITU, 200). 
 
Ghana‟s  NCA  has  the  regulatory  responsibility  of  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  in  
the  industry  and  the  attainment  of  public  policy  goals  in  communications.  
Specifically,  its  functions  include  among  other  things  the  regulation  of  
communications  by  wire,  cable , radio ,  television , satellite and  other related  
technologies in  Ghana.  According  to  Samarajiva ( 2001 ) , national  regulatory  bodies / 
agencies  such  as  NCA  emerged  as  part  of  the  global  demand  for  the  creation  of  
independent, non – arbitrary  and  consistent  decision – making  agencies  to  guarantee  
stable  environment  for  long  term  investment  in  the  telecom  sector.  
 
The  NCA  Act  defines  the  responsibilities  of  this  regulatory body  as  :  
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1. Setting  technical  standards  
2. Licensing  service  providers 
3. Providing  guidelines  on tariffs  chargeable  for  services 
4. Monitoring  the quality  of  service  providers  and  initiate corrective  action  where  
necessary 
5. Setting  terms  and  guidelines  for  interconnections  of  the different  networks 
6. Considering complaints  from  telecom  users  and taking  corrective action  where  
necessary   
7. Controlling  the  assignment  and  use  of  the  radio  frequency  spectrum  
8. Resolving  disputes  between  service  providers  and  between  service  providers  
and  customers  
9. Controlling  the  national  numbering  plan   
10. Controlling  the  importation  and  use  of  types   of  communication  equipment ;  
and  last  but  not  the  least  
11. Advising  the  minister  of  communications  on  policy  formulation  and  
development  strategies  of  the  communications  industry.
37
      
 
Until the formation of the NCA, the Frequency Registration and Control Board (FRCB) 
administered the electro – magnetic spectrum. Before  the  creation  of  the  NCA , 
Ghana  Posts  And  Telecommunications  Corporation ( P&T )  controlled  matters  
related  to  telecommunication  services.  The  NCA  Act  abolished  the  FRCB  and  
put  the  new  body  in  charge  of  regulating  the  industry.  Administratively , the  
NCA  has  four directorates  - Frequency  Management , Regulation  And licensing , 
Legal  and  Finance  And  Administration -  with  a  Director  General  as  the  overseer.  
In  the  absence  of  a  board  of  directors ,  the  Director – General  reports  to  the  
minister  of  communications  .  In  all  respects   the  NCA , Act  has  all  the  trappings  
of  power  that  parliament   found  if  fit  to  endow  a  sensitive  organization   such  as  
the  National  Communication  Regulator . In  formulating  the  bill,  the  government  
frequently  referred  to  the Federal Communications Commission( FCC )  in  the  USA, 
Canadian Radio Television and Telecommunications Commission ( CRTC )  in  
Canada,  and  OFCOM  in  the  UK  as  its  models. 
 
A  look  at  the  trajectory  of  how  the  bill  became  law  suggests  that  the  
parliamentary  process  was  tortuous.  The  bill  made  its  first  appearance  in  
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parliament  on  November  15 , 1994 
38
,  and  for  the  next  two  years  it  moved  in  
and  out  of  Parliament, first  passed  by  the  House  and  then  voted  by  the  
president. A  revised  bill  was  re – introduced  into  parliament  and  passed  into  law  
two  years  after  it  was  first  drafted. Besides  the  President‟ s  veto , a  supreme  
court  case  about  the  legal  status  of  a  radio  station  broadcasting  on  an  
unregistered  frequency  also  delayed  the  1996  re – introduction  of  the  bill. This 
case arose  because a regulatory vacuum  emerged   in  the time spanning  the  adoption  
of  the  1992 constitution and  the passing  of  the  NCA bill  into  law.  The  freedom  
of  media  provision  of  the 1992  constitution  says : “ There  shall  be  no  
impediments  in  the  establishment  of  private  press  or  media  ; and  in  particular  ,  
there  shall  be  no  law  requiring  any  person  to  obtain  a  license  as  a  prerequisite 
or  a  sine qua non  to  the  establishment  or  the  operation  of  a  newspaper  ,  journal  
or  other  media  for  mass  communication  or  information (Constitution of Ghana, 
Chapter 12 ,Article 162 sec. 3)
39
. 
Some  legal  scholars  argued  that this  article  authorizes  the  operation  of  a  radio  
station  and  makes  no  provision  for  licensing  at  all  . Working  with  this  
interpretation , a  new  private  broadcasting  station, Radio  Eye, run  by  an  
Independent  Media Corporation  of  Ghana (IMCG )  started  broadcasting  without  
seeking  government  approval. The Police traced the location of the transmitters and 
confiscated them. The  IMCG  then  took  the  matter  to  the  supreme  court. Thus  
when  the  government    was  ready  to  re –introduce  the  bill  to  Parliament  in  1996, 
it  had  to  wait  until  the  supreme  court  decided  the  case. There  was  a  theoretical  
possibility,  government  believed,  that  the  supreme  court  interpretation  of  the  
constitution  could  void  sections  of  the  draft  bill, if  they  are  found  to  be  in  
conflict  with  
40
the  constitution. Fortunately  for  the  government , the  July  23,  1996  
ruling  of  the  court  upheld  the  government‟s  right  to  regulate  the  radio  spectrum,  
if  the  intention  is  to  ensure  sanity  on  the  airwaves  and  not  to  control  either  
speech  or  the  media. The  Supreme  Court  based  its ruling  on  the  constitutional  
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clause  that  recognized  government‟s  right  to  make  “laws  that  are  reasonably  
required  in  the  interest  of  national  security, public  order , public  morality  and  for  
the  purpose  of  protecting  the  reputations , rights  and  freedoms  of  other  persons “ 
( Chapter 12, Article  164,  1992  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Ghana ).  
 
A  very  notable  feature  of  the  procedures  that  produced  the  NCA  law  was  the  
level  of  contribution  of  industry  stakeholders  outside  government. Parliament  
solicited  the  opinion  of  organizations  that  were  going  to  be  structurally  affected  
by  the  bill. These  include  Posts  And  Telecommunications  Corporation, which  was  
going  to  be  split  into  two;  the  Ghana  Broadcasting  Corporation, which  was  
going  to  lose  its  unchecked  freedom  over  the  choice  of  frequencies  to  broadcast;  
the  National  Frequency  Registration  and  Control   Board  ( NFRCB ) , which  was  
going  to  be  dissolved; and  the  National  Media  Commission  ,  which  was  assumed  
would  take  over  broadcasting  frequencies  regulation. All  these  organizations  made  
representations  before  the  Parliamentary  Committee  on  Transport  and  
Communications. Millicom  Ghana  Ltd., a  local  subsidiary  of  Millicom  Cellular  
International ( MCI ), then  the  only  provider  of  mobile  telephone  services  in  the  
country,  also  submitted  a memorandum. 
 
On  the civil  society, the  School  of  Communications  Studies  of  the  University  of  
Ghana, the  Ghana  Journalists  Association, Private  Newspaper  Publishers  
Associations, and  Independent  Media  corporation  of  Ghana  (IMCG)  all  made  
representations  . (IMCG – now  defunct – was  then  seen  as  a  national  advocate  of  
media  freedom,  following  its  testing  of  the  limits  of  the  law  by  taking  the  
police  to  the  Supreme  Court.)  Dr. B.D.K. Henaku  of  the  University  of  Leiden  
Institute  of Law  and  Mr.  Ohene Ntow, a local journalist, made individual 
submissions. Going  by  the  country‟s  previous  experience,  this  wide  array  of  
input  from  state  and  organized  civil  society  is  rather  comprehensive . That  the  
government  sought  the  opinion  of  the  civil  society  signals   the  importance  of  
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telecom, broadcasting , and  communication  issues  in   general  to  the  national  
imagination. 
 
When  the bill  made  its  second  trip  to  the  Parliament,  it  was  swiftly passed in  
1996. However, no  Board  of  Directors  was  constituted  until  December  2000,  one  
week  to the National Democratic Congress (NDC)  government‟s  relinquishing  of  
power  after  its  defeat  in  the  general  elections. The  outgoing  minister  of  
communications , John  Mahama,  appointed  himself  chairman  of  the  board  and  
swore  other  members  into  office.  An  Accra ( in  Ghana ) newspaper  described  the  
action  of  the  outgoing  minister  in  the  following  terms: “ One  of  the  most  bizarre  
moves  by  the  departing  government  of  the  NDC  was  the  last  minute  
appointment  it  made  to  the  National  Communication  Authority  (NCA). It  was  a  
highly  suspicious  move  that  was  so  audacious  in  its   brazenness  that,  the  NDC  
could  only  have  taken  such  a  decision  to  cover  up  some  misdeeds.”41  But  more  
worrisome  was   the  fact  that  the  NCA  was  made  to  operate  for  four  years  
without  a  board  of  directors  and  only  with  an  acting  director – general. It  has  
been  virtually  impossible  to  find  out  to  what  extent  the  NCA‟s  expected  
position  as  an  independent  regulator  was  compromised  because  of  the  lack  of  a 
transparent  regime  of  operations. But  given  a  scenario  of  an  absent  board  of  
directors,  which  is  expected  to  approve decisions  of  the  director – general, and  
also  the  absence  of  a  substantive  director- general, it  stands  to  reason  that  the  
NCA  operated  more  or  less  as  an  extension  of  the  Ministry  of  Communications. 
 
Once  the  new  the New Patriotic Party ( NPP ) government  assumed  office,  one  of  
its  first  policy  decisions  was  to  reconstitute  the  board. But  the  again  in  a  
ridiculous  turn  of  events,  it  appointed  the  new  Minister  of  Communications  as  
temporary  board  chairman. The  Minister  occupied  that  “ temporary”  position  for  
more  than  a  year. Various  actors  in  the  telecom  sector  questioned  the  
appointment  of   a  government  Minister  as  board  chairman  of  a  supposedly  
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independent  regulatory  agency. Samarajiva ( 2001,2)  has  observed  that  in  many  
developing  countries,  governments  are  wary  of  losing  control  of  what  they  
consider  to  be  legitimate  government  business  to  newly  formed  independent  
regulatory  agencies. The  situation  in  Ghana  closely  resembles  the  Sri  Lankan  
experience  between  1991  and  1996  when,  as  reported  by  Samarajiva,  government  
showed  little  enthusiasm for  the  independence  of  the  telecom  regulatory  agency  
in spite  of  the  well  thought  out  legislation  that  authorized  the  body. 
 
Ghana‟s  NCA  act  clearly  specifies  that  it  is  only  when  there  is  no  board  of  
directors  that  the  director – general  reports  to  the  Minister  and  that  the  only  
regular  relationship  between  the  ministry  of  communications  and  the  NCA  is  an  
advisory  one  on  matters  about  policy. No  one  has  taken  the  step  so  far  to  go  to  
court  to  question  the legality of  a  minister  of  communications  doubling  as  the  
NCA   board  chairman , although  a  local  IT  specialist ,  Dr. Amos Anyimadu  
remains   a consistent  critic  of  the  minister‟s  appointment. In  a  newspaper  
interview,  he  dismissed  the  minister‟s  explanation   that  it  is  regular  practice  in  
countries  such  as  Morocco  that  the  sector  minister  presides  over  the  board: “ He  
should  resign. It is doing a great damage. I  have  read  his  explanation  very  closely  
…The  big  question  they  are  going  to  ask  is  whether  the  regulatory  organ  is  
independent  or  not. If  you  have  a  minister  in  the  chair, then  it‟s  going  to  be  
difficult  to  say  it‟s  independent.”42  
 
Why  was  the  previous  government  reluctant  to  set  up  a  board  of  directors  to  
augment  the  independence  of  the  NCA  and  only  had  to  do  so  when  it  was  
leaving  office? Why  is  the  new  government  reluctant  to  give  the  regulatory  
agency  the  independence  it  deserves  by  appointing  a  separate  board  chairman? 
By  appointing  the  minister  as  the  chair  of  the  board  of  directors,  the  NPP  
government  undermines  the  board‟s  independence  and  gives  itself  control  over  
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who  gets  a  license  to  broadcast,  and  who  gets  to  participate  in   the  telecom  
business. When  the  idea  of  setting  up  NCA  was  introduced  to  parliament  for  the  
first  time  in  1994,  the  then  minister  of  transport  and  communications, Edward  
Salia, premised  the  need  for a national  regulator  on  the  rhetoric of  independence  
from  the  state:”Mr.  Speaker, “the  minister  argued, “the  National  Communications  
Authority  bill  has  been  designed  that  it  will  offer  transparency  in  the  regulations  
of  telecommunication  services  as  well  as  in  the  provision  of  mass  
communications. Contrary  to  popular  but  uninformed  opinion,  the  National  
Communications  Authority  is  not  supposed  to be  at  the  beck  and  call  of  any  
Minister. It  is  an  independent  body  and  for  the  first  time  it  will  be  able  to  
administer  telecommunications  as  well  as  the  broadcast  sector and  give  
individuals  the  opportunity  even  to  go  to  court  when  they  are  dissatisfied  with  
the  behavior  of  the  National  Communications  Authority.”43 If  such  were  the  
founding  ideas  behind  the  setting  up  of  the  NCA, why  would  the state  turn  
around  and  subvert  the  very dream  of  independent  and  strong  regulator? 
 
The  lure  of  controlling  broadcasting  frequencies  is a  likely  source  of  attraction  
for  continued  control  of  the  NCA  for  the  two  governments  that  the  country  has  
experienced  since  the  establishment  of  this  body
44
. During  the  first  round  of  
debates  of  the  NCA  bill  in  parliament,  some  members  called  for  a  new  law  that  
would  spell  out  the  modalities  for  the  allocation  of  frequencies. But this was not 
the road taken. The  politicization  of  NCA  and  the  government‟s  persistent  failure  
to  honor  the  regulator‟s  independence  would  probably  have  diminished, if  the  
process  of  frequency  allocation  were   made  transparent  with  a  more  
comprehensive  legislation  as  some  MPs  even  from  the  side  of  the  ruling  
government  then  suggested. My  belief  is  that  because  the  telecom  sector  remains  
the  most  sensitive  and  arguably  the  richest  sector  of  the  economy, (now  that  the  
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gold  mines  of  Ghana  has  been  completely  privatized)  the   state  is  reluctant  to  
give  up its  control  of  the  industry. The  NCA  is  not  an  issue  one  can  easily  
solicit  opinion  on  at  the  Ministry  of  Communications  and  Technology  in  Accra, 
as  my  experience  there  showed. However, as  a  very  senior  public  servant  at  the  
ministry  told  me  informally, in a telephone conversation from Ghana 20
th
 January, 
2009 government  believed  that  the  minister‟s  appointment  to the  NCA  board  was  
to  help  strengthen  the  operations  of  the  regulatory  agency. However, I  will  dwell  
on  examining  and  analyzing  the  basic  roles  of  the  NCA   in  relation  to  the   law  
and  policy  framework  of  the  telecommunication with particular reference on the law 
on Access and interconnection and comparing it to that of OFCOM and the E-U legal 
regulatory framework on Access and interconnection   in  order  to  find out  whether  
the  NCA  is   really   leaving  up  to  expectation or whether there is a gap between the 
two and the way forward in order to bridge that gap.  
 
2.6 Organizational Structure 
The  National  Communications  Authority  of  Ghana  has  four  major  Divisions  
under  the  leadership  of  the  Director  General. The  Director General  is  responsible  
for  the  day  to  day  running  of  the  Authority. He  reports  to  the  Board  of  
Directors  of  which  he  is  a  member. The  Director – General  is  assisted  by  the  
Divisional  heads  who  are  Directors. These divisions are:  
- Frequency  Management 
- Regulations  And  Licensing 
- Legal 
- Finance  and  Administration 
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                               Objectives of the NCA 
The  NCA  has  set  for  itself  the  following  objectives  to  achieve , in   
the  performance  of  its  role: 
- To  ensure  that  communications  systems  operators  achieve  the  
highest  level  of  efficiency  in  the  provision  of  communication  
services  and  are  responsive   to  consumer  and  community  needs 
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- To  promote  fair  competition  among  persons or organizations   
engaged  in the  provision  of  communication  services. 
 
- To  promote  research  into  and  then  development  of  technologies  
and  uses  of  new  techniques  by  providers of  communication  
services  and  to  develop  adequate  human resources  in  
collaboration  with  such  other  government  department  and  
agencies  as  the  authority  considers  appropriate.
45
     
 
2.7 The Major  Roles  Of  NCA  In  Regulating  the  Telecom 
Industry  In  Ghana. 
The  NCA  has  various  numerous  roles  it  plays  in  order  to  achieve  
its  objectives  as  mentioned  earlier. However, for  the  purpose  of  
this  thesis,  concentration  is  limited  to    five (5)  basic  roles  of  the  
NCA  in  regulating  the  telecom  market  in  Ghana. Broadly  speaking,  
the approach  to  utility  regulation  developed  in the  United  Kingdom  
and  elsewhere in  the  1980s  envisaged  a  transitional  role  for 
regulators  in  the  promotion  of  competition.
46
 
According  to  section  iv  of  the  Ghana  National  Telecom  policy,  
regulation  of  the  telecommunications  market  is  an  essential  
component  of  public  policy  to  ensure  effective  competition  and  
broad,  equitable  development,  consistent  with  the  goals  and  
objectives  set out  in  the  policy. Regulation  is  the  primary  
responsibility  of    the  National  Communications  Authority, with  
guidance  from  the  ministry  of  communication,  and  advise  from  
any  interested  parties   including  the  industry, the  private  sector,  
consumers,  civil  society  and  the  government  in  its  capacity  as  a  
user .  
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2.7.1 Principles  of  Transparent  Regulation 
The  NCA  according  to section  iv  of  the  Ghana  National  
Telecommunication  policy  of  Ghana  shall  conduct all  of  its  
regulatory  functions  in  a  transparent,  open ,  and  non   
discriminatory  manner.NCA  shall  promote  public  participation  in  
and  awareness  of  its  activities   and  ensure  that  the  public  has  
adequate  access to  sector  information.  NCA‟s  regulatory  
proceedings  shall  be  opened  to  the  public  and  all  interested  
parties,  including  the  Ministry  of  Communications,  regulated  
operators  and  consumers  shall  be  allowed  to  participate  in  the  
process,  to  offer  comments  and  to  review  evidence  and  proposed  
decisions. All  decisions  shall  be  arrived  at  in  an  impartial, 
objective  manner  and  the  evidentiary  and  legal  basis  for  these  
decisions  shall  be  provided  at  the  time  the decisions  are  issued. 
Both  the  ministry  through , its  Annual  report,  and  the  NCA  are  
responsible  to  publish  up-to-date  industry  information  based  on  
operator  reports  an  ongoing  monitoring  activities  and  make  these  
available  for  public  review. 
Among  the   major  roles  of  the  NCA  which  will  be  critically 
examined  include  the  following: 
a. Issuing  of licenses, ( with  some  reference  on their  established  
terms  and  conditions  in the issuance  of  license) 
b. Regulating the industry through the law on Access and 
interconnection. This is a primary focus of this thesis in that if it is 
complied with, there is a likelihood that consumers will be well 
protected, tariffs charges in the industry will be affordable and 
competition will be enhanced in the industry.    
c. Tariff  regulation 
d. Consumer  protection  
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The  above  mentioned  roles  could  in  turn , be  assessed  as  in  the  
subsequent  pages  taking into  consideration the legal  framework  of  
the  telecommunication  policy  in  Ghana  with  particular  reference  to  
The  Office  Of  Communication  (OFCOM)  in the UK as  a  
comparative  base
47
. 
 
2.8 Issuing  of  License 
                   A license or grant of license means to give permission. In  
      Other  words  license  refers  to  that  permission  and  as  well  as  to  the  
document  memorializing  that  permission  . License  may  be  granted  by  a  
party  ( “licensor” )  to  another  party  ( “licensee”)  as  an  element  of  an  
agreement  between  those  parties. Also  in  economics, a  license  is  a  
government - issued  permission  to  engage  in  an  activity  or  to operate  a  
business
48
.  Section  4  of  the  Ghana  Telecom  policy  states  that  in  order  to  
encourage  maximum  participation  in  the  sector,  the  NCA‟s  licensing  and  
authorization  regime  shall  be  simple, open, non  discriminatory  and  
transparent. The  policy  continue  to  state  that  there  will  be  two  types  of  
authorizations  to  provide  telecommunications  services  and  to  establish  and  
operate  telecommunication  networks and  these  are:  
Individual  operator  licenses  for  international  and  domestic  facilities- based  
public  telephone  networks  and  services, and  for  certain  dedicated  
transmission  networks  providing  public   signal  distribution,  such  as  cable  
television  systems;  and  Class  Licenses  or  Authorizations  for non  facilities  
based  telecommunications  services,  including  domestic  and  international  
resale  services; and  for private  networks  and  facilities  dedicated  to  closer  
user groups. In  general,  there shall  be  no  limitations  on  the  number  of  class  
licenses  and  authorizations  issued  by  NCA for services  subject  to such  
authorizations. NCA   may  in  certain  instances  introduce  limits  if  it  
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determines  consistent  with  this  policy  that  additional  licenses  would  not  be  
in  the  public  interest  , as  long  as  any  such  limitations   are  non  
discriminatory vis-a–vis current  operators  in  the  market. Regarding  individual  
licenses,  the  NCA  shall  determine,  in  consultation  with  the  Ministry,  the  
extent  to  which  the  number  of  licenses  may  be  limited, subject  to  the  
provisions  of  section  2  of  the  telecom policy.  Where use of scarce resources 
would be required, NCA shall exercise its regulatory authority over the allocation 
of such resources in connection with the issuance of licenses. The NCA has the 
responsibility of ensuring that operators that are issued with license to operate 
comply with the terms and conditions under which they are issued out with the 
license. On the other hand  non – compliance on the part of any operator will 
therefore mean the issuance of penalties on such operators which include huge 
fines, non renewal of license and in some cases  revocation of licenses for 
repeated non – compliance. 
However, this role performed by NCA could be used effectively in regulating the 
industry. For instance it could use it to either restrict or encourage entry into the 
industry. 
 
2.9 Access and Interconnection Regulation                       
Competition in the telecom industry is essential to ensuring a well developed sector
49
. The 
National communication Authority in Ghana has the responsibility of ensuring that it 
regulates competition in the industry effectively, otherwise it could lead to the collapse of 
infant operators in the industry. A comprehensive framework for ensuring fair competition 
is critical to effective market development. This framework consists of all the policies, 
procedures, rules, regulations and the necessary administrative structure related to the non 
discriminatory allocation and administration of scarce resources, licensing, interconnection, 
equal access, dispute resolution and access to information. The objective is the 
establishment of fair, transparent, and non – discriminatory competition regulatory 
treatment throughout the telecommunications market place. 
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According to the National Telecommunication Policy in Ghana, one way by which NCA 
could regulate competition is through allowing for interconnection. According to the 
policy, companies licensed to operate public telecommunications networks and to provide 
telecommunication services are obligated to provide interconnection for purposes of 
transmitting traffic between subscribers of different networks
50
. Moreover, Article 20 
paragraph 1 of the NCA ACT 1996 (Act 524) say that subject to the approval of the 
Authority and subject to such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties, an operator may 
interconnect his communication systems to the communications systems of another. The 
NCA shall establish and administer an interconnection regime, which will be non – 
discriminatory and transparent, and will promote fair and effective competition for all 
promoters
51
. Operators may be free to negotiate interconnection agreements among 
themselves on such terms and conditions as they may choose , so long as such terms are 
non discriminatory to other market participants
52
. The NCA shall facilitate such 
negotiations, and encourage operators to achievement in a timely manner.  
In situations where the parties concerned are unable to reach satisfactory interconnection 
agreement through negotiations, the NCA intervenes to determine interconnection terms, 
either through mediation or specific interconnection rulings. The NCA in Ghana also 
establishes general terms, conditions and methodologies that it will apply in reviewing 
interconnection proposals, including the basis for determining interconnection charges. 
Such charges are normally suppose to be cost oriented, and based upon the unbundled costs  
of network elements  required for interconnection. 
Moreover, from my research operators with significant market power in given 
telecommunications market segments are required by law to publish a Reference 
Interconnection Offer (RIO), indicating all conditions of interconnection to their networks, 
which will be available to all potential interconnecting operators. This Reference 
Interconnection Offer must however, be approved by NCA following, following review of 
its provisions. Other conditions and procedures for ensuring fair interconnection will be 
provided by NCA through Formal Interconnection Regulations. 
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It is therefore, imperative to state that the NCA has as one of its role the jurisdiction  to 
resolve disputes among  competing operators in all matters, especially those related to 
negotiation of interconnection arrangements or allegedly anti- competitive practices .All 
rulings on competitive disputes will  be transparent and non- discriminatory , and will be 
resolved in the shortest time possible. The NCA in performing this role, issues formal 
Regulations setting forth the procedures and requirements for dispute resolution 
proceedings.  
 
 
2.10 Tariff Regulation      
The NCA is responsible for regulation of the tariffs of services provided by dominant or 
monopoly telecommunication operators (i.e. operators with significant market power), 
where market forces are insufficient to constrain service pricing. The NCA‟s tariff 
regulation practice according to an official of the NCA is aimed at establishing cost – 
oriented prices for all regulated services. Where current tariffs are significantly out of 
balance with respect to cost, the NCA promotes and monitors the phased rebalancing of 
such tariffs subject to considerations of affordability. The NCA by record executes this role  
such that operators ` tariffs do not lead to anti competitive cross – subsidy of competitive 
services by  monopoly or dominant operators , or other market distortions  that  tends to 
inhibit fair  and effective competition in the telecom industry. 
Tariffs in market segments where there is, in the NCA‟s determination, effective market 
competition (i.e. no carrier posses‟ significant market power) will be deregulated or subject 
to forbearance, requiring only informational filings and requirements for adequate 
customer notice of tariff changes and other consumer protection provisions. The NCA in 
this regard establishes procedures for determining where tariff deregulation or forbearance 
is appropriate. In regulating the telecom industry through tariffs, it also ensures that it takes 
account of the interest of consumers in the industry especially those with lower incomes, in 
its tariff determinations. In the interests of Universal Access Objective, the NCA according 
to the telecom policy shall consider such measures including targeted discounts that may 
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ensure that basic telephone and information services are reasonably affordable to all 
citizens. 
 
2.11 Consumer Protection   
Consumers interest in the telecom industry are sought to be protected in two main ways, 
and that is through ensuring quality services provided by the telecom operators and also 
through fraud prevention and privacy protection. 
With regards to quality of service the NCA ensures that the telecommunication services of 
licensed operators are of adequate quality to meet the needs of users and also establish 
standards and regulations to monitor service quality. Licensed and authorized operators 
according to Ghana telecom policy will be required to submit periodic reports on their 
performance according to NCA determined standards, and NCA is empowered to verify 
these reports through independent investigation. Technical standards to be covered by 
service quality provisions may include the bandwidth and signal quality of transmission 
networks; connect failure rates and measures of network congestion; incidence of customer 
outages and average repair times and such other indicators as the NCA may establish. The 
NCA also publicize the quality of service performance of operators on a region by region 
basis and may also establish specific requirements for compensation and recourse where 
required standards are not met. The  Ghana national telecom policy mandates the NCA to 
establish  policies  that require  operators and service providers respond appropriately  to 
customer complaints and enquiries and provide reasonable and convenient access to 
customer service representative. Unfortunately, the role of NCA in Ghana is not 
encouraging as juxtaposed to that of OFCOM which is very phenomenon in this regard. 
 
In terms of fraud prevention and privacy protection, the NCA is responsible for protecting 
consumers of telecommunication services from unfair and deceptive marketing practices, 
and from unwarranted use of private customer information. The NCA establishes 
regulations for monitoring and preventing such behavior, including such penalties for 
operators who violate these standards as the legislature may authorize. The NCA according 
to the policy shall establish formal complaint review procedure and shall require all 
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licensed and authorized telecommunication operators and service providers to establish 
their own procedures for responding to customer complaint
53
. Informal interview 
conducted with some officials in the industry revealed that although they have their own 
system or procedures of responding to customer complaints, the NCA has not been active 
enough in monitoring whether the telecom operator procedure in compliance with that 
established by the NCA supposed to be a standard procedure. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 AN OVERVIEW OF OFCOM AS THE REGULATOR OF THE UK TELECOM 
INDUSTRY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ever since British Telecom was privatized in 1984, there has been a continuous policy 
debate over how the UK Telecommunications sector should be regulated to adapt to rapidly 
changing technologies and markets.
54
 
The Office of Communications or as it is more often known, OFCOM, is the independent 
regulator and competition authority for the communication industries in the United 
Kingdom. Ofcom was initially established in the enabling device, the office of 
Communication Act 2002, but received its full authority from Communication Act 2003. 
On December, 29
th
 2003, Ofcom inherited the duties that had previously been the 
responsibility of five regulatory bodies namely: The Broadcasting Standards Commission, 
the independent television commission, the office of telecommunications (OFTEL), the 
radio authority, and the Radio Communications Agency. 
More importantly, OFCOM being the UK communications regulator replaced its 
predecessor OFTEL to be specific as parts of a governmental shake up of the media and 
telecommunications regulations at the turn of the millennium. The impetus behind its 
creation was the increasing convergence of broadcasting and digital communications. Back 
in December, 2000, the culture secretary Chris Smith decided that corporations such as the 
BBC, Sky and NTL increasingly had merged interests in digital TV, broadband and e – 
mail, and one overseeing body was more appropriate for the digital age. Today OFCOM 
has about 800 staff and an annual budget of approximately 130 million pounds. Its 
organizational structure resembles that of a company with a CEO responsible for the day to 
day leadership and a body akin to the board of directors
55
. Comparatively this is the same 
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as that  of  the NCA  in Ghana but the  difference  is that most  of the NCA staff in Ghana, I 
am told are working on part time basis . 
Besides, the Minister of Communication in Ghana doubles as the Chairman of the NCA 
which is completely different from that in the UK. This practice in Ghana does not ensure 
the full independence of the NCA hence their power to some extent is compromised. 
OFCOM as stated earlier is independent of the UK Government but accountable to 
Parliament through the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom has a number of areas of 
responsibility. In the broadcasting arena it is charged with protecting audiences from 
offensive and harmful material, maintaining plurality of provision and ensuring the high 
quality of and wide appeal of TV and radio programming .It also ensures the optimal use of 
the airwaves used by a range of spectrum users. In telecom Ofcom works to ensure that 
there is a wide range of electronic communications services – including high speed data 
services. Ofcom is largely funded by the companies that it regulates .Ofcom has enjoyed a 
high profile since its inception .In the recent past it has heavily fined the BBC ,GMTV  and 
ITV over phone in  scandals, received  thousands of complaints over the Big Brother shilpa  
shetty controversy and fined Barclaycard for silent calls. 
According to Chief executive Ed Richards, “the interests of citizens and consumers in UK 
are the heart of everything we do at Ofcom
56
.     
 
3.2 The UK Communication Act 2003 
UK telecommunications operator must operate within the legislative framework set by the 
communications Act 2003. This Act implemented a set of EU directives from 2002 which 
sought to modernize and further harmonize communications regulation across the 
European Union. Considering the telecommunication sector (as distinct from the 
broadcasting sector which Ofcom also regulates) , the Communications Act abolished the 
need for telecommunication operators to hold  a license in order to provide 
telecommunications network and services ( with the exception of spectrum use which still  
require a license ,e.g. mobile operators) . Instead, a kind of self certification scheme was 
introduced whereby operators need to ensure it complies with set of general conditions in 
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order to be allowed to do business. There are over 20  general conditions which detail an 
array of rules, including interconnection standards , number of portability, deployment of 
telephone numbers , access to emergency services , sales and marketing standards , special 
service for the disabled , broadband migration codes and so on . Ofcom‟s investigation unit 
monitors compliance and resolves complaints in relation to the general conditions.  
 
3.3 Regulation of Telecom operators in The UK  
An important part of Ofcom‟s work is to regulate the commercial behavior of dominant 
telecommunication operators who may have a potentially harmful influence on competition 
and consumers
57
. The communications Act has borrowed well known concepts from 
general competition law to allow Ofcom to achieve this objective. Ofcom carries out 
market reviews of the various economic markets on a regular basis (normally every 3 to 4 
years) to establish whether any particular operator is dominant or in the language of the 
Communications Act has a Significant Market Power (SMP).
58
However, an operator is 
deemed to have an SMP in a particular economic market if either individually or jointly 
with others ,it enjoys a position  equivalent to dominance , that is to say  a position of 
economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.
59‟ 
If Ofcom finds out that an operator has SMP, it can impose specific SMP conditions to 
ensure that the SMP operator does not gain an unfair competitive advantage by virtue of its 
market influence .SMP conditions may include an obligation to interconnect with other 
network operators, non discrimination obligation, price controls and so on. However, in 
fixed telecommunication BT still has SMP in most key economic markets by virtue of 
being the legacy owner of the largest telecommunications network in the country. 
 
3.4 Strategic Telecommunications Review 
In a bid to improve its regulatory work of the telecom sector in the UK, Ofcom in 2005 
concluded a major strategic review of the fixed telecommunications sector using its 
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separate powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 .Among the objectives of the review was to 
determine whether the sector was suffering from competition problems of such a persistent 
nature that they could not easily be remedied using Ofcom‟s specific market review powers 
under the communications Acts
60
. 
The outcome of the strategic review was that BT offered a host of undertakings to Ofcom 
by which it agreed to set up a separate network access division called Open reach and also 
to offer its wholesale products on an equivalent basis to both external customers (cable & 
wireless, car phone warehouse etc...) and its own downstream divisions. The undertakings 
have brought about a fundamental shift in the way in which BT does business with all its 
customers.  
From a regulatory perspective, the undertakings are unique to the UK and are being 
actively studied by regulators in other European countries who experience similar 
competition problems arising from the presence of a large incumbent telecommunications 
operator. This is however, a good practical example which can be adopted by the NCA in 
Ghana.  
 
 
3.5 The Competition Appeal Tribunal   
Telecommunication operators are able to appeal Ofcom decisions to the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal who can review both the legal and economic analysis undertaken by 
Ofcom
61
. The Tribunal can also overturn decisions if it does not agree with Ofcom‟s 
decisions or reasoning. The Appeal route to the tribunal has proven popular among 
telecommunication operators in UK seeking a second view. The tribunal by March, 2008 
had about 14 appeals against Ofcom decisions pending before it.
62
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3.6 How the UK Telecom Industry was regulated prior to the Adoption of the E-U 
Interconnection Directive 
Until the implementation of the Interconnection Directive in the Member States, there was 
no harmonized access and interconnection policy in the E-U, and each member state took a 
different approach
63
. When Mercury communications became licensed in the UK to 
provide fixed line telephony in competition with British Telecom (BT) in 1981, BT was not 
required to interconnect with it and in some instances refused to do so, arguing that 
Mercury customers should install an additional line ( with additional telephone ) for 
making and receiving calls from other Mercury customers.
64
Only with the commencement 
of the telecommunication Act 1984 was the Director General of telecommunication 
empowered to mandate interconnection.
65
It was not long before the DGT was called upon 
to use these powers, and the first determination setting terms and condition on which BT 
and Mercury were required to interconnect was made in October 1985.
66
 This included a 
determination as to the charges which BT could levy, which were calculated on the basis of 
fully allocated costs, including a return on the capital invested. A number of further BT and 
Mercury determinations were made in the following years, as well as determination in 1991 
for the interconnection arrangements between Mercury and Vodafone and between 
Mercury and BT Cell net (the two mobile network operators at the time).
67
 In 1994, 
OFTEL now known as OFCOM commenced a major review of interconnection pricing. 
The review was needed to take account of the growing level in sophistication of the 
interconnection product needed and a growing requirement on the part of operators to 
purchase disaggregated interconnection service. In 1996/97 OFTEL required that BT‟s 
interconnection charges be based on the forward looking incremental cost of replacing 
capital assets, rather than the historic cost of what the assets cost when originally 
purchased.
68
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3.7 The Implementation of the Access and Interconnection Directive in the UK 
The Interconnection Directive was implemented in the UK through the telecommunications 
(interconnection) Regulations 1997, SI 1997/ 2931 (interconnection Regulations) and 
through amendments to operators‟ telecommunications license in accordance with the 
Licensing Directive.
69
  
 
3.7.1 Determination of Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP) and Request 
for Access  
Oftel determined that Kingston Communications and BT had SMP in the provision of fixed 
networks and services and leased line, and that cell net and Vodafone had SMP in the 
market for mobile networks and services. These operators were therefore required to meet 
all reasonable requests for access to their network.BT and Kingston Communication were 
also required to publish a reference interconnection offer and to provide access services at 
cost- orientated prices.
70
  
 
3.8 The E-U Access and framework Directive  
The Access Directive defines   „Access‟ as : ….the making available of facilities and 
service to another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non- 
exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic communication services. It covers 
inter alia: access to network elements and associated facilities, which may involve the 
connection of equipment, by fixed or non fixed means, access to the physical infrastructure 
including buildings, ducts and masts; access to relevant software systems including 
operational support systems, access to number translation or systems offering equivalent 
functionality, access to fixed and mobile networks in particular for roaming, access to 
conditional access systems for digital television service; access to virtual network 
services.
71
 It is clear that the commission has sought to define access very broadly, catching 
not only network access but access to physical infrastructure such as ducts and masts, and 
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to related facilities such as software. The inclusion of „virtual network services‟ in the 
definition also seems to imply that access obligations can be imposed on those who do not 
own the underlying network, but have other rights to use it. Interconnection on the other 
hand is defined in the Access Directive as: …..the physical and logical linking of public 
communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in order to allow the 
users of one undertaking to communicate with the users of the same or another under 
taking, or to access services provided by another undertaking . Services may be provided 
by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the network. Interconnection is 
a specific type of access implemented between public network operators.(Article 2(b) )
72
 
There is therefore no doubt that interconnection is then considered to be a category of 
access under the European regulatory regime. 
 
3.8.1 Overview of the Access conditions under the Access Directive  
The Access Directive envisages that Member states will have the power to impose several 
different types of access obligations. These obligations can be summarized as follows: 
A. Member states must impose a general obligation on all providers of public electronic 
communications network to „negotiate interconnection‟ with other such providers on 
request. 
 
B. National regulatory authorities may impose additional obligations on operators 
designated as having SMP on a specific market, requiring that they meet reasonable 
requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities. 
 
C. National regulatory authorities are to encourage and, where appropriate, ensure adequate 
access and interconnection and interoperability of services in a way that promotes 
efficiency, sustainable competition, and gives maximum benefits to end users. 
 
D. National regulatory authorities must impose specific access obligations in relation to 
conditional access services. 
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3.9 Brief Comparison between Ofcom and NCA of Ghana 
One area of observation has to do with the composition or organizational structure of the 
two national regulatory bodies. The two has board of directors and a chief executive that 
sees to the day to day running of the body. However, the NCA board of directors is chaired 
by the Ministry of communication but this is not so with Ofcom which has a chairman 
independent of the government. This makes Ofcom independent and more effective than 
the NCA. 
 
Ofcom is a full time body as juxtaposed with that of NCA which is run on a part time basis 
and therefore makes it practically difficult for NCA to realize its full potential or objective 
of effectively regulating the telecom sector. Ofcom oversees both the broadcasting sector 
and the telecommunication sector whilst the NCA is restricted to overseeing only the 
telecom sector. The broadcasting sector is the sole responsibility of the National Media 
Commission which a separate body. This implies that Ofcom has a greater responsibility 
than the NCA. 
 
In the UK there is a special competitive Appeal tribunal where telecom operators can 
appeal any decision affecting them, but this is not the case with the Ghanaian telecom 
operators. This makes it practically difficult for the operators in the industry since they will 
have to resort to the normal courts where it takes a long time for cases to be disposed of 
due to the huge back log of cases. 
 
The Access and interconnection Directive has had a significant impact on the UK telecom 
industry as the major operators are now allowing access of their physical infrastructure 
And interconnection of their networks to new entrants in the industry. This in effect 
encourages a healthy competition in the industry. This is however, a major problem in 
Ghana as the big operators find it very difficult to allow access and interconnection of their 
physical infrastructure and network. 
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In Ghana interconnection charges are cost oriented and based upon the unbundled costs of 
network elements required for interconnection where as interconnection charges in the UK 
is based on the forward looking incremental cost of replacing capital assets. This therefore 
encourages the big operators in the industry to grant access and interconnection. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The Act establishing the NCA gave it wide range of powers to address the concerns of 
regulating and managing the sector .Section 41 (1) of the NCA Act 524, granted it the 
authority to make regulations among others in relation to rules and guidelines on tariffs, the 
international Accounting System, terms and conditions for interconnectivity, technical 
standards in the provision of the telecom service and general regulations for the sector. 
However, consideration of the activities of the Authority and the developments in the 
sector points to a fact that the NCA in Ghana is grappling with the thorny problem of 
putting critical structures in place to regulate and manage the sector efficiently. 
 
Regulations are very important in controlling, providing frameworks for operation and 
ensuring the protection of the interests of both operators and consumers.  The research 
reveals that the NCA has not or is not yet able to provide comprehensive regulations for the 
sector during its first three years in operation. The absence of regulations has weakened the  
hold of the  NCA  on the telecom operators and this has not provided a conducive 
environment in which all operators may effectively perform. Ironically, it has provided a 
means of leverage for the operators to pursue what they think are in their best interests. The 
trade war between the cellular mobile telephone operators and Ghana Telecom (until 
March, 2009 when it was sold to Vodafone, UK) and the uncompromising resistance of the 
latter to increase interconnection capacity of the former are typical examples. 
 
Given the lack of regulations in the sector, the NCA could apply the reliefs provided in the 
Act. Section 21 (1) provided the NCA with the Authority to withdraw or suspend the 
license of any operator who fails to comply with the conditions of his license. However, the 
question that readily comes to mind is, does the NCA have the moral right or as it were the 
courage to suspend or withdraw the license of Ghana Telecoms? It is practically impossible 
as the company controls over 90% of the market. On the other it is evident that Ofcom has 
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the power to suspend the license of Vodafone or any British Telecom if it practically 
violates or goes contrary to the terms of license. 
 
In the absence of regulations and modalities for interconnectivity, the NCA has been 
drawing on the experiences of other countries particularly from Ofcom in the UK and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to guide negotiations between operators. 
 
The research also revealed that the fundamental problem facing the NCA is lack of 
experience in managing the sector as compared to Ofcom with a wide array of specialist 
and experienced gurus in the herm of affairs. The NCA was established comparatively only 
recently (1997) and still requires time to build up its capacity to address the problems and 
challenges facing the sector. For example it has yet to acquire the full complement of staff 
with the requisite skill and expertise to run on full time basis.   
 
Another revelation has to do with the issue of interconnection. Interconnectivity between 
competing telecom operators has been the bane of the global restructuring of the telecom 
sector. The inherent interdependent of the network and the inherited overwhelmingly 
entrenched position of the established operator make interconnection negotiation a difficult 
process
73
. 
This has characterized all interconnection negotiations because the new entrants have 
nothing to offer except the threat of taking a portion of the market of the former monopoly. 
As can be predicted (and based on experiences in UK and elsewhere), interconnection 
negotiations in Ghana have been difficult. This has happened on two fronts: first between 
Ghana Telecom and Westel on one side, and also between Ghana Telecom and the cellular 
mobile operators on the other. Interconnection difficulties delayed the commencement of 
operations by the latter company. Central to the problem of stalled interconnectivity 
negotiations between Ghana Telecom and Westel was the issue of the ratio for revenue 
sharing from incoming international calls. After the initial bickering, the NCA was able to 
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mediate an interconnectivity agreement between the two companies. Some of the agreed 
terms are as follows: 
-Local calls: 50% - 50% for both operators; 
-Trunk calls: 30% (the network that carries the call for the long the distance)- 70% (the 
network where the call terminates); 
-International: in- coming calls 20 % (the network where the call terminates) – 80% 
(gateway where the call was routed). 
 
With interconnection between Ghana telecom and the cellular mobile operators, the 
problem has been one of increased capacity for the cellular mobile operators to expand 
their service. The latter have accused the former of being reluctant to increase their 
interconnection capacity to facilitate their expansion programmes. Interestingly, the most 
affected cellular mobile operator is spacefon now taking over by MTN the very company 
Ghana Telecom is engaged in negotiation over GSM frequency. 
 
Clearly, the problem of interconnection has affected telecoms development in the country. 
It has practically limited the capacity of the other operators to expand their service. 
Political inclinations have probably contributed to stalling the negotiation process. It is 
apparent that almost all the operators have strong bases in the political system of the 
country and therefore cannot easily be lent upon by the regulatory authority. This 
effectively undermines the independence and authority of the NCA in resolving conflicts. 
For example, it took ministerial intervention to resolve interconnection conflicts between 
Ghana Telecom and Westel and it is becoming obvious in the case between Ghana 
Telecom and Spacefon (currently taking over by MTN).  
 
Also it is worth noting that wide penetration and service quality are important overall 
system goals of telecom policies. In order to achieve these goals, tariffs must be set such 
that actual and potential subscribers can afford service at the same time enabling the 
operators to cover their costs and accumulate sufficient funds for future expansion. 
However, in this regard The NCA has not been influential in the introduction of an 
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innovative tariffs system in the telecom sector. The introduction of competition into the 
national network, though quite recent, has not affected the level of tariffs in the sector 
either. In a competitive or liberalized market, operators should be sensitive to the level of 
tariffs they charge so as not to loose market share. However, there have been no moves by 
the operators in the telecom industry to grant concessions in tariffs to attract more 
subscribers. Instead, Ghana Telecom has indicated its intention to revise its tariffs upwards. 
The company argues that it was made to keep to what it calls „subverted tariffs‟ fixed by 
the government in 1995 when it was a public organization. Now Ghana telecom is 
suggesting that there is the need to increase tariffs to take care of inflation. However, the 
hidden truth is that Ghana telecom‟s market position is not yet threatened by its opponents 
which is still developing it network. Thus, it has little competitive incentive to reduce 
prices. In the case of the cellular mobile operators, there appears to be some form of trade 
cartel in operation. Since the commencement of operations by the companies in the telecom 
sector, their standard call charges have remained the same. For instance, the standard call 
charge of Tigo Company which was formerly known as mobitel remained at 0.5 US 
Dollars for peak periods 0.4 US Dollars for off peak periods since 1993.The same applies 
to spacefon and Celltel Company. In effect there is no competitive tariff system in the sub 
sector, as every operator feels secured with the existing level of tariff charged. However, it 
is therefore evident that there are policy tariffs which seeks to ensure that level of tariffs are 
reduced on weekends and some occasions. 
 
4.1 Summary of Recommendations 
From the above discussion and analysis, it is therefore worth noting that, for the NCA in 
Ghana to chart its way successfully in regulating the telecom sector it should learn from the 
experiences of Ofcom in the UK. 
The biggest step to ensuring effective regulation, in my humble opinion, would seem to be 
a clear and necessary review and amendment of the National Telecommunications Policy 
in the first place. 
The NCA should revise its policy in order to ensure that operators in the telecom sector 
improve upon their quality of service. Unlike Ofcom the NCA must recruit people who 
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have the requisite skills and expertise to run the authority on a full time basis. Besides the 
various telecommunication Acts enacted by parliament to govern the sector must empower 
the authority such that all operators in the sector regardless of their status will succumb to 
their authority. 
 
What has also emerged from my discussion of regulative issues is the lack of distinction 
between the executive branch of government and the NCA (where as in the UK Ofcom is 
completely distinct and independent from the government). For the president to take a 
unilateral decision on an issue that is being resolved by the purportedly independent NCA 
does not augur well for the development of the national regulator as a strong policing 
agency at the periphery of the global digital economy. Writing  from the experience of 
being a former head of  Sri Lanka‟s Telecom Regulatory Commission , as well as being a 
veteran theorist in international communication, Rohan Samarajiva (2001)
74
  notes that the 
relationship between the state  and regulatory agencies worldwide, with the probable 
exception of the Nordic countries have not been without problems of interference. He notes 
that President Bush‟s replacing William Kennard as FCC chairman shortly after coming 
into office in January, 2001 demonstrates that “independence has subtle nuances, even in 
the country that invented the concept.”75   
 
Nonetheless, independence is fundamental to the realization of the objectives for which the 
new regulators in developing countries were put in place. In countries where good 
governance is yet to be developed as a culture of the state, the national regulator needs 
distance and insulation from the state‟s whims. Samarajiva argues that “a firewall to keep 
out the virus of bad governance” is needed in such countries in such because bad 
governance has its own logic, which ultimately undermines the independence and 
legitimacy of the regulator. One of the most important elements of effective regulation is 
legitimacy beyond mere legality. This type of legitimacy is achieved when various 
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constituents of the telecom sector accepts the authority of the regulator in matters of 
arbitration and even opinion. When such legitimacy is lacking, telecom operators are likely 
to challenge the authority of regulators by appealing to the executive as in the Westel (now 
Zain) example or through litigation to the judiciary. Oftentimes, when the regulator‟s 
legitimacy is lacking corruption finds it way in, through the back door.     
 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
The discussion so far as shown that there has been a tremendous and a positive growth in 
the telecom sector in the country, which is a direct result of the liberalization of the sector. 
Liberalization has facilitated telecoms penetration (such as MTN, Zain, Vodafone and 
many others which are in the offing to enter the sector) and has given the subscribers the 
ability to choose between operators. However, certain actions such evaluation of the 
capacity of Ghana Telecoms to take care of added volumes were disregarded and this has 
undoubtedly affected the quality of service. Lack of a strong regulatory agency has 
contributed, inter alia, to problems in interconnection negotiations. One clear implication is 
that the NCA will have to be strengthened to enable the effective development of firmer 
regulatory oversight. At present it manifests many of the problems of it contemporaries 
elsewhere. Lacking a full complement of regulatory staff, it is vulnerable to the actions of 
politically supported incumbents and new entrants. Ghana‟s liberalization and privatization 
experiment is still running its course. As elsewhere even with OFCOM in the UK, the 
future presents a picture of continuing and unfinished business. 
 
However, I strongly believe that a model suitable and similar to that of, the Ofcom model 
could be a good legal regulatory framework for Ghana.   
Also, effective implementation and enforcement of rules which are equivalent to the 
“Access and interconnection Directive” and suitable in Ghana (which even led to the 
transformation of OFTEL to OFCOM in the UK) will lead to effective competition, 
affordable tariffs and above all ensure that consumers in the industry are well protected.   
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